, Steven Rosefielde, D. Quinn Mil Masters of Illusion, American L 

[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.We know now that a resultwould likely have been to avoid the disaster of 9/11, but that’s hindsight.Before the tragedy occurred, who imagined it? Not even Hollywood fanta-sized such an event.How would President Clinton have justified to critics themurder of a man only suspected, not tried and convicted, of involvement interrorist attacks on us? He couldn’t have pointed to the World Trade Centerdisaster as the reason because no one would have imagined it, or believedhim if he had foreseen it.Critics would have demanded evidence that theattack was likely, that it was imminent, that it would be successful, thatthere were not other, less violent ways to avoid its occurring.We would havesearched among the rubble in which bin Laden’s body lay to find the plansfor some horrid attack in order to justify our action.Would we have foundP1: FCW0521857449c13Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:6326The American Responsethem? Not likely.Then the president would have been subject to criticismfor using deadly force where it was not needed.Where does the critic’s string of logic – which many people in our countryand the rest of the world espouse – lead? It begins by arguing that we shouldnever resort to force first; that we must always be attacked, and only thendefend ourselves.Suppose that in 1941 we were attacked by Japan, then asour response gathered force, Japan had offered to cease fighting and makesome reparations to us alone, would we then have been required by this ruleof moral action to abandon our allies and cease the war – leaving China,Britain, France, and the Netherlands to their fate? Probably, because by thestandards of those who oppose conflict at nearly all costs we could nothelp those who later became our allies until we were attacked by our allies’enemies.It was this string of logic that led America to stay so long out ofthe international conflicts that became the two world wars that we createdgreat losses for ourselves in ultimately winning them.CALCULATING THE RISKThere has been discussion over the centuries about the circumstances underwhich preemptive war should be permissible.They stress the immediacy ofan attack by the adversary, clear evidence of the intent to attack, the lack ofany other alternative, and that the force used should be proportional to thethreat.In effect, the notion is that a nation can defend itself by preemptiononly at the time that the attack is imminent and that only to the extentnecessary to deflect the attack.These standards, although plausible, would not have prevented the horrorof World War II or the Holocaust.By the time that the Western powers wouldhave been authorized by these standards to preempt Hitler, the Nazi statewould have been so strong that only the full rigor of World War II wouldhave been sufficient to destroy Nazism.Similarly, in the Pacific Americacould not have acted, according to these standards, until the Japan fleet wason its way to Pearl Harbor in December 1941 – a time sufficient – had wehad proper intelligence about the coming attack and so ourselves attackedthe Japanese fleet en route to Hawaii – to prevent our naval disaster at PearlHarbor, but certainly far too late to have avoided the Pacific War with Japan.In effect, the standards proposed for preemptive war make preemption solelya tactical resort – all strategic consequence is removed from it.The nationacting preemptively must let its adversary arm itself fully, chose its time andmethod of attack, and even then can only parry the blow (the rule is that thepreemptive action must be directly proportional to the attack anticipated).P1: FCW0521857449c13Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:6Strategic Independence: An Ounce of Prevention327Today, when states are vigorously seeking to build nuclear arsenals, andperhaps biological weapons as well, to wait for the potential adversary tofully arm itself before responding could and is likely to be suicidal.Hence,there is a strong argument for strategic preemption – to avoid a great conflictin the future.Preemption is the method by which a strong power can protect itself fromthe rise of enemies who are likely at some point to attack it.It is a way toreduce the losses ultimately sustained.The analysis is extremely difficult because enemies both disclose and denysimultaneously (as did Hitler, Stalin, Saddam, and others) their aggressiveintentions.They disclose their intended attacks to rally their supporters;they deny them to mislead us, knowing that there is a strong opposition inour country and among our allies to any act of preemption.This is the paradox of preemption – that if it is successful, it can neverbe proven beyond doubt to have been necessary and is always subject tocriticism that it wasn’t really necessary.However, truly great presidents whoare dutiful students of history will use their worldly knowledge to describeother situations that shared important characteristics (that might not beobvious on first glance) as well as other risk factors that heighten the dangerto convince Americans that there is a huge risk in doing nothing.That is allthat need be proved.Americans are coming of age.They are now matureenough to accept that as long as they don’t feel they are being oversold.This is also true of the war in Iraq, for which it might seem that weapons ofmass destruction in Saddam’s hands might have justified preemptive war.Certainly President Bush said so [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
  • zanotowane.pl
  • doc.pisz.pl
  • pdf.pisz.pl
  • anikol.xlx.pl