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.Giap explained to American journalist Stanley Karnow in 1990:We were not strong enough to drive out a half-million Americantroops, but that wasn t our aim.Our intention was to break the will ofthe American Government to continue the war.Westmoreland waswrong to expect that his superior firepower would grind us down.If wehad focused on the balance of forces, we would have been defeated intwo hours.We were waging a people s war.America s sophisticatedarms, electronic devices and all the rest were to no avail in the end.Inwar there are the two factors human beings and weapons.Ultimately,though, human beings are the decisive factor.Giap s willingness to send hundreds of thousands of his soldiers totheir deaths, and the willingness of his soldiers to fight on despite suchheavy losses, would ultimately determine the outcome of the groundwar in Vietnam. 9AIR WARThe U.S.military could never be sure of its controlof the ground during the war in Vietnam.A pacified village mightharbor Viet Cong sympathizers who would report on American troopmovements or plant booby traps to help the Communists.Jungles andhillsides might be honeycombed with the enemy s underground tunnelsand bunkers.A trip down a peaceful-looking road could prove suicidalafter dark.But Americans ruled the air over Vietnam with supreme con-fidence.Never before in the history of warfare had air power been usedso extensively to attack the enemy, to destroy enemy cover and foodsupplies, and to carry out dozens of other tasks.The lavish use of airpower in Vietnam symbolized American technological know-how andmaterial resources.In the end, though, statistics on numbers of mis-sions flown and tons of bombs dropped were no more a guarantee ofvictory than were the body counts on the ground.American pilots in Vietnam were an elite group; they were carefullyselected, highly trained, and highly motivated.They had a wide array ofthe world s most sophisticated weapons at their disposal.Among thefighter-bombers employed in Vietnam was the air force s F-100 SuperSabre, which primarily provided air support for ground troops in SouthVietnam.The F-105 Thunderchief nicknamed Thud for the soundit was said to make when it crashed was used by the air force exten-sively over North Vietnam.The navy and Marine Corps operated the A-4 Skyhawk and the A-6 Intruder.The B-52s of the air force s StrategicAir Command were also employed in both South and North Vietnam.The supersonic F-4 Phantom fighter served the air force, navy, and94] 95AIR WARNORTH VIETNAM S AIR DEFENSES, 1969 1972LAOSNORTHVIETNAMCHINALang SonYen BaiDien Bien Phu KepPhuc YenHoa LacGia LamHanoiBach MaiHaiphongDuong SuongTHAILAND Cat BiKien AnQuang TiQuan LangGulfBai ThuongofTonkinVinhLAOSDan LoiHanoiCHINAKhe PhatNORTHVIETNAMDong HoiNTHAILANDSOUTHGulfVIETNAMofTonkinCAMBODIACAMBODIA0 100 nautical milesCAMBODIA0 100 nautical kmAirfield runway length Known or estimatedmore than 6,000 feet SAM sitesAirfield runway lengthSAM envelopeless than 6,000 feet 96VIETNAM WARmarines, and shot down the majority of enemy planes (mostly Russian-and Chinese-built MiGs over North Vietnam).In South Vietnam, American air power was used to support theground troops in a variety of ways.Helicopters transported them intobattle zones and evacuated the wounded; gunships and fighter-bombershit enemy positions with machine-gun fire, bombs, rockets, andnapalm.One type of air support later came back to haunt many U.S.soldiers.In 1962 the air force began to spray chemical defoliants in Viet-nam, to kill off the vegetation that provided hiding places in jungles andforests for Communist forces.In Operation Ranch Hand, speciallyequipped C-123 cargo transport planes, flying just 150 feet above tree-top level, sprayed the defoliating chemicals over the target zones.Theunofficial motto of the Ranch Hand pilots was Only you can preventforests. They also used herbicides to destroy food crops that the VietCong depended on.Twelve million gallons of a chemical spray calledAgent Orange, named after the color of the barrels in which it wasstored, were sprayed over South Vietnam.In 1969 a scientific report linked Agent Orange, which contained apoisonous chemical labeled 2,4,5-T (a type of dioxin), to birth defectsin laboratory animals.Critics of American policies in Vietnam worriedabout Agent Orange s effects on members of the civilian populationwho came in contact with the spray.Its use was ended in 1970.But itwas not only civilians who were at risk.American servicemen oftencame in contact with Agent Orange, either on Ranch Hand crews or aspart of ground forces moving through areas sprayed with defoliants.Inthe years following the Vietnam War, many veterans began developingskin and liver diseases and cancer, or had children suffering from birthdefects.In 1982 a group of veterans who believed their health had beendamaged by Agent Orange sued the chemical companies that producedthe spray.The case was settled with an agreement by the companies toestablish a fund for Agent Orange victims.The air war over North Vietnam was a major part of the Americanstrategy for victory.President Johnson s advisers believed that bombingcould bring North Vietnam s leaders to their knees; however, they werenot always in agreement as to how much would be required to do thejob.Military leaders complained of the restraints imposed on theAmerican bombing campaign.U.S.planes were not allowed to attackthe center of Hanoi, or the port of Haiphong, or the dikes that criss-crossed North Vietnam s richest agricultural lands.In the early months 97AIR WARThis C-123 Ranch Hand aircraft sprays defoliant in areas near Tay Ninhand An Loc, South Vietnam.(National Archives)of Operation Rolling Thunder, the bombing was concentrated onNorth Vietnam s transportation system: its roads, bridges, and rail-roads.President Johnson maintained tight personal control over thecampaign, choosing many of the targets to be hit at regular Tuesdaylunch meetings in the White House [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |
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