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.But geography was hardly the basis for a sound marriage.Many bandits resisted discipline, and the Communists executed them once the military situation was stable.Still, if bandits could be “remolded” to accept discipline they made fine soldiers, brave and used to hardship.After all, they had come from the peasantry, not the landlord class.Chiang Kai-shek was to persist in calling the Communists “bandits” as a generic insult to the end of his days.The Jinggangshan base area had some successes, and some peasants came to believe that a certain “Zhu-Mao” who gave them land was destined to possess the Mandate of Heaven.Again, Mao was not the only Communist to make contacts with bandits, and CCPleaders had reason to fear that bandits might convert Communists instead of the other way around.After all, both groups used armed gangs of poor people to swoop down on wealthy families and towns.Bandits, however, moved around to flee pursuit and find new victims.What rural Communists needed was a stable base area.Mao thus led the Red Army east to the hill country of the Jiangxi–Fujian border region around the town of Ruijin.This area was slightly more hospitable, though still remote.This became the Jiangxi Soviet: not a lair but a functioning government.It was in the Jiangxi Soviet that the CCP “experimented” with a mix of policies that allowed it to survive: peasant-based guerrilla war; land reform to create popular support; professional army troops; and a willingness to abandon the cities indefinitely to “counter-revolutionary” forces.The Jiangxi SovietMao Zedong was not yet a member of the top echelons of the CCP, but he commanded the Jiangxi Soviet – at least most of the time.22 From late 1929to late 1934 Mao built a “revolutionary base area” eventually covering over thirty counties and perhaps two million people in southwestern Jiangxi and western Fujian.The soviet faced continuous attacks from Nationalist armies, and from within the soviet Mao faced opposition both from the CCP’s top leadership and from local cadres.But, through victories and defeats, the Communists learned a great deal about peasant revolution.The main lessons can be summarized in four points.First, an army as well trained and equipped as possible was necessary, though ultimately political280Nationalism and revolution, 1919–37rather than military factors were decisive.Second, a safe base area was necessary to convince peasants to take the risk of supporting the Communists and to provide resources for the army.“Base area” thus refers not to a military camp but to farming country, though in remote or inaccessible terrain.Third, poor peasants alone provided an insufficient base of support; since stable and long-term administration rested on the middle peasants as well, radical land redistribution policies were self-defeating.And fourth, peasant support and the economic success of the soviet therefore depended on moderate land reform that in turn rested on astute social analysis.The revolution of the base area was at heart a land revolution that dispossessed what the Party defined as an exploiting class of landlords.It released energies sufficient to fend off attacks for five years and built up military and civilian bureaucracies.The region encompassed by the future Jiangxi Soviet had already experienced mobilization during the National Revolution and the Northern Expedition.It is worth emphasizing that Mao did not bring Communist ideas to the area – that task had been accomplished by radicalized educated youth of the region in the 1920s.We have already seen how Communists such as Shi Cuntong, Shen Dingyi, and Peng Pai emerged from small towns to join the Party; it was also common for local youth who studied perhaps at the provincial capital – like Mao Zedong – to return home and teach.Newly founded Westernized schools were a major source of employment for the educated youth of the period.In the wake of the White Terror, radical youth also returned home to escape from persecution in the cities.Young schoolteacher radicals spread ideas about nationalism, communism, and modernity.In the case of the Jiangxi Soviet, local radicals were protected by the arrival of Mao’s forces, but they did not necessarily agree with all of Mao’s policies.Mao maintained a precarious personal dominance in the region until 1933.His Red Army combined guerrilla tactics with a base strategy [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |
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