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.For example, Paramount evolved from the theatrebusiness started by Adolph Zukor, and became the largest of the verticallyintegrated companies after merger with the theatre operator Publix in1925.Of the assets owned by the majors, investment was dividedapproximately into five per cent production and one per cent distribution,with exhibition accounting for the remaining ninety-four per cent.AsDouglas Gomery argues, to gain 'a clear picture of the studio era one hasto characterise the Big Five as diversified theatre chains, producingfeatures, shorts, cartoons, and newsreels to fill their houses' (1986: 8).While the power of the majors lay in their control of exhibition, in thedomestic market the majority of theatres were owned by large or smallindependent exhibitors.The collective theatre holdings of the Big Fiveaccounted for only twenty-five per cent of the total theatres in the UnitedStates.Ownership of theatres by the majors was, however, strategicallyplanned to maximise earnings from admissions.The situation variedbetween different areas and locations.In some locations, the majorsdominated the local market by acquiring or building the main first-runhouses.Elsewhere, particularly in the largest cities of the United States,neighbourhood or subsequent-run theatres were more important.Theatrebuilding and buying therefore followed local patterns of movie-going (seeHuettig 1944).Although the majors were in principle competitors, they neverthelesscolluded in mutually beneficial ways.To meet the demand for new productin their own theatres, the majors would book films from other members of41 SHORT CUTSthe Big Five and the Little Three.Also, the geographical siting of theatresin the domestic market was divided up so as to prevent the majorexhibitors encroaching on territory controlled by other vertically integratedstudios.Paramount dominated the South, New England, and the upperMidwest, with Fox taking the Far West, Warners controlling the mid-Atlantic states, and Loew's and RKO dividing New York, New Jersey andOhio between them (see Gomery 1986).The first-run theatres of themajors therefore represented only a fraction of the total theatres in thecountry, however ownership was strategically organised to control theentire domestic market.Alongside the theatres they directly owned, the majors also organiseddeals with independent theatres.Outside of the films produced by majors,it would be impossible for independent exhibitors to find any supplierswith a sufficient volume of films to fill their screens all year round.Although small independent producers did exist, independent exhibitorswere reliant on the majors for supplying the bulk of the films shown.Thissituation placed the majors in a position to force non-competitive tradingpractices in their dealings with independent exhibitors.Block-bookinginvolved distributors selling films as a package rather than individuallyand any block of films would combine major quality releases with moreaverage and poor product.A price was set for the whole package, offeringtop titles at a lower price than they could be bought individually, whileeffectively raising the price of poor films.For the major distributors, block-booking had the advantages of guaranteeing sales of films in volume andspreading marketing costs across a whole group of films rather thanindividual titles.Blind-selling was a related practice, through which filmswere sold to exhibitors with maybe only a catalogue description ornumber as a reference.The status and profitability of the first-run theatresowned by the majors was protected by the further trade practices ofclearance (determining the number of days to pass between runs intheatres) and zoning (setting regional areas in which clearance conditionsapplied) [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |
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