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.Samit sent a twenty-six-page memo onAugust 20, 2001, citing that Moussaoui had been training on Boeing 747 flightsimulators and had bought a pair of small knives, leading him to believe thatMoussaoui was a terrorist bent on hijacking an airliner.This document arrived atFBI headquarters, but it never made it up the FBI s chain of command.The vitalinformation linking Moussaoui to the Chechen rebels and their connection with Samit, Harry 261al-Qaeda in the FISA application was removed by the FBI s deputy counsel, thuskilling the application.The head of the CIA, George Tenet, did receive a briefingbased on FBI information about Islamic fundamentalists learning to fly, but notabout Moussaoui.Samit also sent an e-mail to the FBI s bin Laden unit, but hedid not receive a response before September 11, 2001.Becoming frustrated by theFBI, Samit tried to notify theInformation about MoussaouiFAA by memo of the possiblethreat of an attempt to hijack anSpecial Agent Harry Samit, under cross-examination asairliner.Again FBI headquartersMoussaoui s death-penalty trial.acknowledged thatcensored the memo.Still deter-French intelligence advised the FBI 12 days before themined to communicate his suspi-attacks that Moussaoui was very dangerous. The par-cions, Samit talked with a tially declassified French cable of Aug.30, 2001, also saidMoussaoui had been indoctrinated by Islamic extremistsMinneapolis FAA official, butand had been in Afghanistan.But despite those red flags,nothing came of the contact.Samit said, a request for a special national security warrantMuch as others in the Minneapo-to search Moussaoui s belongings was like earlierlis office, Samit became increas-ones shot down by headquarters supervisor Michaelingly bitter, but he refused toMaltbie and his boss, David Frasca.He said Maltbie hadattack the FBI directly as his col-voiced concerns that an inadequately documented war-league Colleen Rowley did.rant request would hurt his career.Samit said headquar-Samit even informed the CIA sters went so far as to delete from one warrant requestCounterterrorism Center aboutinformation from French intelligence that linked thethe Moussaoui case.The CIAleader of a Chechen rebel group with whom Moussaouireacted with enthusiasm about had associated to al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.Headquarters then said Minneapolis agents had failed tolinking Moussaoui with othertie Moussaoui to an international terror group.intelligence information.FBIheadquarters, however, reactedGreg Gordon, Moussaoui Alerts Ignored, Agent Says, Sannegatively to the CIA s receivingFrancisco Bee (March 21, 2006), p.A1.this information.Samit wasrebuked for making this contact.Orders came down from FBI headquarters that the Minneapolis field office couldcontact others only through headquarters.Samit did go along with the scheme to deport Moussaoui to France where Frenchintelligence would then search his belongings and communicate their findings backto the FBI.Unfortunately, this plan was to be implemented on September 10, 2001.This scheme meant that news of the search would arrive back to the FBI sometimelate on September 11 or September 12.Events on September 11 ended this initiative.After September 11, there was no problem obtaining a criminal warrant for Samit.The search found some incriminating evidence, and the most important was the tele-phone number of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one of the leaders of the Hamburg Cell.In his testimony at the Moussaoui trial in 2006, Samit gave his version of theMoussaoui case.He also blasted his superiors at FBI headquarters.He went so faras to accuse them of criminal negligence, obstruction, and careerism. See AlsoBin al-Shibh, Ramzi; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Moussaoui, Zacarias; Rowley,Coleen; Tenet, GeorgeSee DocumentsDocument #30; Document #40 262 Saracini, Victor J.Suggested ReadingGreg Gordon, Terror Timeline Connects the Dots, Star Tribune [Minneapolis] (June 4,2006), p.16A; Neil A.Lewis, F.B.I.Agent Testifies Superiors Didn t Pursue MoussaouiCase, New York Times (March 21, 2006), p.A12; Jerry Markon and Timothy Dwyer, FBIWas Warned about Moussaoui, Washington Post (March 21, 2006), p.A1; Richard GidPowers, Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI (New York: Free Press,2004); Richard A.Serrano, Agent Faults FBI on 9/11, Los Angeles Times (March 21,2006), p.A1; Richard A.Serrano, 9/11 Trial Reveals Troubles Then, and Ahead, LosAngeles Times (March 26, 2006), p.A5.Saracini, Victor J.(1950 2001)Victor Saracini was the captain of the United Airlines Flight 175 that hijackersseized on September 11, 2001, and flew into the South Tower of the World TradeCenter.He had worked as an airline pilot for United Airlines for sixteen years atthe time of his death.At the time of the crash, Saracini was either dead or inca-pacitated.Saracini made a success of himself after a slow start.He was born on August 29,1950, and raised in Atlantic City, New Jersey.After dropping out of high school,Saracini worked a variety of jobs before applying to study at the New Mexico Insti-tute of Mining and Technology.He graduated in 1975 with a bachelor of generalstudies degree.His next career move was attending the Naval Aviation OfficerCandidate School.Saracini successfully completed naval aviation training andbecame a naval pilot.He was commissioned as an ensign in December 1975.Heserved on S-3A anti-submarine warfare aircraft aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S.Saratoga.His active-duty service ended in 1980, but he remained in the NavalReserve at Naval Air Station Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, until 1985.Saraciniattained the rank of lieutenant and served as a crewmember on a Lockheed P-3Orion aircraft.After leaving the navy, Saracini worked as a flight instructor atLouisiana Tech University during the years 1980 82.It was at Louisiana Tech thathe met and later married his wife Ellen Saracini [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |
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